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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH : 
Plaintiff7Appellee, : 
v. : 
DYAN LYNN MARTINEZ, : Case No. 20001063-CA 
Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from a final judgment1 for the payment of restitution pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-20l(4)(a)(i) (1999), in the Third Judicial District Court, State of 
Utah, Salt Lake Department, before the Honorable Roger A. Livingston. 
Jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-
3(2)(e) (1999), which grants this Court jurisdiction in criminal cases not involving a 
conviction for a first degree or capital felony. Appellant Dyan Lynn Martinez 
("Ms. Martinez") was convicted of Workers' Compensation Insurance Fraud, a second 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-110 (1998), and "'Attempted 
Distribution,' offering, agreeing, arranging to distribute methamphetamine," a third 
degree felony in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(l)(ii) (1998). 
1
 A copy of the minutes of the "Sentence, Judgment, Commitment," R. 91-93, is 
attached as Addendum A. 
STATEMENT OF THE FIRST ISSUE, STANDARD OF REVIEW, AND 
PRESERVATION OF THE ARGUMENT 
Issue: Did the sentencing court err in its interpretation of the restitution statute, 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-20 l(4)(a)(i) (1999), when it ordered restitution in the amount of 
$14,647 related to criminal conduct for which Ms. Martinez was not convicted, did not 
plead guilty, and did not admit responsibility? 
Standard of Review: In general, this Court "'will not vacate an order of 
restitution unless the trial court abused its discretion or exceeded its authority.'" State v. 
Dominguez. 1999 UT App 343,1J6, 992 P.2d 995 (quoting State v. Westerman. 945 P.2d 
695, 697 (Utah Ct. App. 1997)). "'However, if the trial court's order is premised on 
statutory interpretation, as it is here, we afford the trial court's interpretation no deference 
and review for correctness.'" Id. 
Preservation of theArgument: This issue is preserved on the record at 
R.77[ll-14]. 
STATEMENT OF THE SECOND ISSUE. STANDARD OF REVIEW. AND 
PRESERVATION OF THE ARGUMENT 
Issue: Whether plain error occurred when the sentencing court relied upon double 
and triple hearsay in determining the amount of restitution in violation of Ms. Martinez's 
due process rights. 
Standard of Review: To succeed on a claim of plain error, the defendant must 
show: "(i) [a]n error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and 
2 
(iii) the error is harmful." State v. Dunn. 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993). 
Preservation: This issue was not raised below and, thus, must be reviewed for 
plain error. See State v. Patience. 944 P.2d 381, 388-89 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) 
(considering claim of due process violation in sentencing as plain error). 
STATEMENT OF THE THIRD ISSUE, STANDARD OF REVIEW, AND 
PRESERVATION OF THE ARGUMENT 
Issue: Was there sufficient evidence to support the sentencing court's conclusion 
that pecuniary damages in the amount of $14,647 were caused by Ms. Martinez's 
admitted conduct where there was absolutely no evidence to support the sentencing 
court's finding that Ms. Martinez was not entitled to receive Oxycontin and that she 
would have been prescribed Methadone in the absence of her admitted acts? 
Standard of Review: Whether a defendant's admissions sufficiently establish the 
criminal responsibility to support a restitution order is a question of law. See State v. 
Watson. 1999 UT App 273, f 5, 987 P.2d 1289. Additionally, this Court will overturn 
an order of restitution based upon insufficiency of the evidence if the appellant 
demonstrates "that the clear weight of the evidence contradicts" the sentencing court's 
order. State v. McBride. 940 P.2d 539, 541 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). A trial court's factual 
finding is reviewed for clear error. See State v. Benvenuto. 1999 UT 60, TflO, 983 P.2d 
556. 
Preservation of the Argument: This issue is preserved on the record at 
R. 77[14-20]. 
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STATEMENT OF THE FOURTH ISSUE. STANDARD OF REVIEW, AND 
PRESERVATION OF THE ARGUMENT 
Issue: Did the sentencing court err in failing to resolve objections and correct 
errors in the presentence report when Ms. Martinez objected to the accuracy of the 
contents of the presentence report and the court did not consider those objections or 
make any findings on the record as required by Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(6)(a) (1999)? 
Standard of Review: "Whether the trial court properly complied with a legal duty 
is a question of law which we review for correctness." State v. KohL 2000 UT 35, ^|32, 
999 P.2d 7 (citing Slatterv v. Covev & Co.. 909 P.2d 925, 927 (Utah Ct. App. 1995)). 
Preservation of the Argument: This issue was preserved on the record at R. 77[3, 
7,11-14,17,19-20]. 
RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The following provision from the United States Constitution is relevant on appeal. 
The Fifth Amendment provides, in pertinent part: 
. . . nor shall any person . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law . . . . 
U.S. Const, amend. V. 
The following provision from the Utah Constitution is relevant on appeal. 
Article I, section 7 provides: 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process 
of law. 
Utah Const., art. I, § 7. 
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The following statutes are determinative of the issues on appeal. 
Restitution, Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (1999); 
Presentence Investigation, Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (1999). 
The full texts of these statutes are provided in Addendum B. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Ms. Martinez was charged by Information with one count of Workers' 
Compensation Insurance Fraud, a second degree felony in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 34A-2-110 (1998),2 one count of Unlawful Possession of a Controlled Substance 
[Oxycontin] with the Intent to Distribute, a third degree felony in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 58-37-8(l)(iii) (1998); and two counts of Obtaining a Controlled Substance 
[Oxycontin] by Fraud, a third degree felony in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-
8(3)(a)(ii) (1998). R. 3-4. The count relating to attempted distribution of Oxycontin 
was subsequently amended by the State to Attempted Distribution of Methamphetamine, 
a third degree felony in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(l)(ii) (1998). R. 4; 
90[2]. 
Pursuant to a guilty plea on the counts of Workers' Compensation Insurance 
Fraud and Attempted Distribution of Methamphetamine, the charges relating to 
Obtaining Oxycontin by Fraud were dismissed. R. 39. In her plea, Ms. Martinez 
2
 The Information incorrectly cited the relevant provision as Utah Code Ann. § 35-
1-109 (1953 as amended). 
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admitted only to '"working under an assumed name while receiving benefits" and 
attempting to distribute methamphetamine. R. 39. 
In addition to suspended prison sentences, a jail sentence, and a fine, 
Ms. Martinez was ordered to pay restitution of $14,647 to Workers' Compensation Fund 
of Utah ("WCF"). R. 91-93; 77[24-27]. The sentencing court determined the amount 
of restitution as the cost of the Oxycontin prescribed to Ms. Martinez by her physician 
minus the cost of Methadone, a significantly cheaper alternative medication that 
allegedly would have been prescribed absent Ms. Martinez's misconduct. R. 77[15-19]. 
Ms. Martinez argued at the sentencing hearing that the amount of restitution was 
improper because it imposed restitution for conduct to which she did not plead guilty or 
admit responsibility. R. 77[11-14]. Specifically, the court considered allegations made 
by the State and included in the presentence report ("PSR") that Ms. Martinez distributed 
Oxycontin and received amounts of Oxycontin in excess of her prescription through 
fraud. R. 77[11-15]. Ms. Martinez denied committing these acts or any responsibility 
for them. R. 77[11-13]. Moreover, the charge that would have supported the court's 
order of restitution, Obtaining a Controlled Substance [Oxycontin] by Fraud, was 
dismissed and the charge of distributing Oxycontin was amended by the State to 
Attempted Distribution of Methamphetamine. R. 77[13]; R. 39. 
Ms. Martinez further argued that the court's order assumed, incorrectly, that she 
was not entitled to receive Oxycontin from her physician or that she received Oxycontin 
6 
from anything other than a valid prescription. R. 77[14—15]. Ms. Martinez objected to 
the amount of restitution because it erroneously assumed that the cost of Methadone, 
which had already been found to be medically inappropriate by her doctor, was the 
proper cost basis for the medical benefits to which Ms. Martinez was actually entitled. 
R. 77[17]. Finally, Ms. Martinez raised objections concerning inaccuracies in the PSR. 
R. 77[7, 11-13, 17, 19-20]. Ms. Martinez filed a timely notice of appeal. R. 64. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On November 10, 1991, Dyan Lynn Martinez ("Ms. Martinez"), the appellant, 
suffered a severe back injury while working at Olsen's Greenhouse Gardens. R. 61 [2]. 
After the injury, Ms. Martinez filed a claim with WCF, from which she was awarded 
medical and lost wage benefits. Id_ In 1994, she was placed on permanent total 
disability and awarded $1,040 per month as compensation. Id. Due to the seriousness of 
her injury, Ms. Martinez underwent multiple back surgeries. R. 61 [2]. 
In September of 1997, unable to function without pain medication, Ms. Martinez 
was prescribed Oxycontin, a long-lasting narcotic, by her physician, Dr. Joel T. Dall 
("Dr. Dall"). 14; R- 48. Both WCF and Dr. Dall acknowledged that pain medication 
was the only course of treatment left open to Ms. Martinez and that Oxycontin was an 
appropriate medication for her condition. R. 48; 61 [3]. 
Faced with an increased financial burden due to her husband's fatal illness, 
Ms. Martinez began working under an assumed name at Salt Lake Community College, 
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where she was sporadically employed part time from 1996 to 1998. R. 61 [2]. At some 
point, WCF became aware of allegations that Ms. Martinez was working under an 
assumed name, was obtaining amounts of Oxycontin in excess of her prescription by 
fraud, and was distributing Oxycontin. Dr. Dall and WCF indicated that, had they been 
aware of these allegations, Ms. Martinez would not have been prescribed Oxycontin. 
R. 61 [3-4]. Due to these allegations, Dr. Dall, at the behest of WCF, attempted to 
substitute Methadone, a lower-cost alternative to Oxycontin, for Ms. Martinez's 
condition. R.48. However, Methadone proved to be inappropriate because Ms. Martinez 
is allergic to Methadone and suffered a severe skin rash. Id. The Methadone prescription 
was terminated immediately and Ms. Martinez was prescribed MS Contin. Id^ 
On October 29, 1999, the District Attorney for Salt Lake County filed an 
Information charging Ms. Martinez with: Count I, Workers' Compensation Insurance 
Fraud, a second degree felony in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-110 (1998); 
Count II, Unlawful Possession of a Controlled Substance [Oxycontin] with the Intent to 
Distribute, a third degree felony in violation on Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1 )(iii) (1998); 
and Counts III and IV, Obtaining a Controlled Substance [Oxycontin] by Fraud, a third 
degree felony in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(3)(a)(ii) (1998). R. 3-4. 
Subsequently, Count II of the Information was amended by interlineation to "'Attempted 
Distribution,' offering, agreeing arranging to distribute methamphetamine," a third 
degree felony in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(l)(ii) (1998). R. 4; 90[2]. 
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On September 5, 2000, Ms. Martinez entered guilty pleas to Counts I and II of the 
Amended Information. R. 38^44. Specifically, she admitted to '"working under an 
assumed name while receiving benefits" and attempting to distribute methamphetamine. 
R. 39. In exchange for Ms. Martinez's guilty pleas for Workers' Compensation 
Insurance Fraud and Attempted Distribution of Methamphetamine, Counts III and IV of 
the Amended Information relating to obtaining Oxycontin by fraud were dismissed. 
R. 38; 90[2]. 
At sentencing on November 6, 2000, Ms. Martinez received suspended prison 
sentences of one to fifteen years and zero to five years, a jail sentence of sixty days, 
forty-eight months of probation, and a fine of $400. R. 91-93; 77[24-27]. Additionally, 
the court ordered Ms. Martinez to pay restitution to WCF in the amount of $14,647. IdL 
Ms. Martinez filed a timely notice of appeal. R. 64. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
In ordering Ms. Martinez to pay restitution for the difference in cost between 
Oxycontin and Methadone, the sentencing court misapplied Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 
(1999) and violated procedural due process. Under section 76-3-201, restitution may be 
ordered only if the defendant "has been convicted of a crime that resulted in pecuniary 
damages and agrees to pay restitution or admits to the criminal conduct." State v. 
Watson, 1999 UT App. 273, %3, 987 P.2d 1289. Further, under the restitution statute and 
due process, the sentencing court must focus solely upon the "firmly established 
9 
admission[s] of responsibility" and may not order restitution based upon further 
inference. Id.: see State ex rel. Schroeder. 598 P.2d 373, 374-75 (Utah 1979). 
Here, the sentencing court erred by imposing restitution based, in large part, upon 
allegations that Ms. Martinez received amounts of Oxycontin in excess of her 
prescription and attempted to distribute Oxycontin. R. 77[15—18]. However, 
Ms. Martinez only admitted to working under an assumed name and attempting to 
distribute methamphetamine. R. 39. In no way did Ms. Martinez ever admit to or accept 
responsibility for such acts as fraudulently obtaining Oxycontin in excess of the 
prescribed amount or attempting to distribute Oxycontin. 
Additionally, the sentencing court improperly relied upon double and triple 
hearsay in the form of statements included in the presentence report. Due process 
requires that the sentencing court '"act on reasonably reliable and relevant Information in 
exercising discretion in fixing a sentence.'" State v. Johnson, 856 P.2d 1064, 1071 (Utah 
1993) (quoting State v. HowelL 707 P.2d 115, 118 (Utah 1985)). The Utah Supreme 
Court has found that double and triple hearsay is so "inherently unreliable and presents 
such a high probability for inaccuracy that it cannot stand alone as the basis for 
sentencing." State v. Johnson, 856 P.2d 1064, 1071 (Utah 1993). Here, the unreliable 
double and triple hearsay formed the sole basis for the court's determination of the 
amount of restitution. 
Moreover, there was insufficient evidence presented to support a finding that 
10 
Ms. Martinez's admitted conduct was the "but for" cause of $14,647 in pecuniary 
damages, as required by the restitution statute. See State v. McBride. 940 P.2d 539, 
543-44 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). Here, the "clear weight of the evidence" shows that 
Ms. Martinez would have been prescribed Oxycontin, even though she was working 
under an assumed name. Regardless of Ms. Martinez's admitted conduct, she was still 
entitled to receive full medical benefits as a result of her disability, including appropriate 
pain medication. R. 77[8-9]. Dr. Dall had previously determined that Oxycontin was the 
appropriate medication for Ms. Martinez's condition. R. 48. Further, there is no reliable 
evidence to suggest that Ms. Martinez would have been prescribed Methadone rather than 
Oxycontin based upon her admitted acts. 
Finally, the sentencing court erred by failing to resolve, or even address, 
Ms. Martinez's objections to inaccuracies in the presentence report prepared in her case. 
Under Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(6)(a) (1999), when a defendant objects to the contents 
of a presentence investigation report, the sentencing court is required to "resolve on the 
record any claimed inaccuracies in the report." State v. Veteto, 2000 UT 62, f 13, 6 P.3d 
1133. Ms. Martinez repeatedly objected to the contents of the presentence report. 
R. 77[7, 11-13, 17, 19-20]. Nevertheless, the sentencing court failed to resolve these 
objections. While the inaccuracies need not be resolved in order to vacate the restitution 
order, on remand the trial court should be directed to enter an order resolving the 
objections. 
11 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE RESTITUTION ORDER IMPOSED UPON MS. MARTINEZ 
WAS ERRONEOUS BECAUSE IT TOOK INTO ACCOUNT CONDUCT 
FOR WHICH SHE WAS NOT CONVICTED. DID NOT ADMIT. OR DID 
NOT PLEAD GUILTY. 
The sentencing court misapplied the restitution statute, Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-
201(4)(a)(i) (1999), when it imposed restitution for conduct for which Ms. Martinez was 
not convicted, did not plead guilty, and did not admit responsibility. Section 76-3-
201(4)(a)(i) states: 
When a person is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted in 
pecuniary damages, in addition to any other sentence it may impose, the 
court shall order that the defendant make restitution to victims of crime as 
provided in this subsection, or for conduct for which the defendant has 
agreed to make restitution as part of a plea agreement... . 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-20l(4)(a)(i) (1999).3 The statute defines "criminal activities" as 
"any offense of which the defendant is convicted or any other criminal conduct for which 
the defendant admits responsibility to the sentencing court with or without an admission 
of committing the criminal conduct." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-20 l(l)(b) (1999). 
This Court has interpreted the restitution statute as requiring that "[a] court may 
order restitution only if the defendant has been convicted of a crime that resulted in 
pecuniary damages and agrees to pay restitution or admits to the criminal conduct." State 
3
 In interpreting this statute, the "'fundamental rule of statutory construction is that 
statutes are to be constructed according to their plain language."' State exrelN.K.C, 
1999 UT App 345 T|9, 995 P.2d 1 (citation omitted). 
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v. Watson, 1999 UT App 273, p , 987 P.2d 1289. Furthermore, "the statute requires that 
responsibility for the criminal conduct be firmly established, much like a guilty plea, 
before the court can order restitution." Id. at }^5.4 Moreover, as under the Oregon 
restitution statute that served as the model for section 76-3-201, the sentencing court 
"must insure that formalities of an admission are met before restitution can be ordered." 
Id. (citing State v. Voetberg. 781 P.2d 387, 389 (Or. App. 1989)). 
The restitution statute furthers the due process requirement that restitution be 
imposed only for conduct for which a defendant has admitted responsibility or been 
convicted. See Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 465 (1991) ("Every person has 
a fundamental right to liberty in the sense that the Government may not punish him unless 
and until it proves his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at a criminal trial conducted in 
accordance with the relevant constitutional guarantees."). Specifically regarding 
sentencing and the imposition of restitution, this Court has stated that "[t]he demands of 
due process rest on the concept of basic fairness of procedure and demand procedure 
appropriate to the case and just to the parties involved." State v. Robinson. 860 P.2d 979, 
982 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (citations omitted); see also State v. Gomez. 887 P.2d 853, 
854-55 (Utah 1994) (stating that defendant entitled to "due process protections during 
4
 In interpreting the similar federal restitution statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3663, the United 
States Supreme Court has limited federal restitution for the "specific conduct that is the 
basis of the offense of conviction." Hughev v. United States. 495 U.S. 411,413 (1990) 
(limiting restitution to damages resulting directly from offense for which defendant pled 
guilty, not for related offenses that were dismissed as part of a plea bargain). 
13 
sentencing to prevent procedural unfairness"); State v. Sanwick, 713 P.2d 707, 708 (Utah 
1986) ("Procedural fairness is equally mandated at the sentencing phase as at the guilt 
phase."). 
One such demand of due process is that restitution be imposed only for that 
conduct for which a defendant has admitted responsibility or been convicted. See State 
ex rel. Schroeder, 598 P.2d 373, 374-75 (Utah 1979) (stating, where a juvenile admitted 
to damaging one motor home, "[i]t seems to us that it would be a distortion of justice, and 
of due process, for the court to simply assume that other damages caused in the area [in 
this instance, four other motor homes] were chargeable to wrongful conduct of this 
juvenile; and to impose that damage as a penalty where, as is the situation here, there was 
no evidence offered, and no admission of guilt on his part, upon which to place upon him 
the responsibility for that damage."); In re Cache Valley Syndicate Trust, 587 P.2d 525, 
528 (Utah 1978) ("It is not consistent with established concepts of equity or due 
process . . . for the court to disenfranchise . . . without evidence in support thereof the 
wife of a trust employee who pleaded guilty to charges of felonious misconduct with 
regard to management of the trust.). 
In State v. Watson, this Court confronted an analogous case and ruled that an order 
of restitution based upon conduct for which the defendant did not plead guilty or admit 
responsibility was erroneous. Watson, 1999 UT App 273, ][5. In Watson, the defendant 
pleaded guilty to attempted obstruction of justice after driving two suspects to and from a 
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murder scene and for selling the car used in the crime. Id. at 1[2. Based upon the 
homicide and the defendant's alleged "state of mind" rather than the defendant's admitted 
conduct, the trial court ordered the defendant to pay restitution to the victim's family. Id. 
at 11112, 4. 
This Court reversed that order, stating that the restitution statute is "more narrow" 
in that it requires the trial court to focus only "on admissions made to the sentencing 
court." Id. at 1f5. Therefore, because the defendant had only admitted to the obstruction 
of justice charge from which no pecuniary damages arose, "there was no firmly 
established admission of responsibility upon which to order [the defendant] to pay 
restitution." Id; see also State v. GallL 967 P.2d 930, 937-38 (Utah 1998) (reversing 
restitution order for bail jumping where defendant was not convicted of bail jumping and 
did not admit responsibility). 
As in Watson, the sentencing court here improperly considered conduct for which 
Ms. Martinez did not plead guilty and did not admit responsibility. The court made 
inferences based on this alleged conduct to erroneously conclude that Ms. Martinez 
would not have received Oxycontin and imposed restitution for its cost. 
Ms. Martinez entered guilty pleas to one count of Workers' Compensation 
Insurance Fraud and one count of Unlawful Possession with Intent to Distribute 
Methamphetamine. R. 38-44. As to the Workers' Compensation fraud charge, 
Ms. Martinez only admitted that "[f]rom about 2/27/96-2/28/97 and in 1998 for a few 
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months, I Dyan Martinez obtained workers compensation benefits by working under an 
assumed name while receiving benefits for being unemployable." R. 39. Regarding the 
second charge, Ms. Martinez admitted that "on or about 9/8/98 I attempted to distribute 
methamphetamine by asking another person if he wanted to obtain some from me." Id 
Neither admission was related to her receipt of Oxycontin, any alleged fraud related to 
Oxycontin, or distribution of Oxycontin. Moreover, the only charges that were related to 
Oxycontin were dismissed in exchange for her guilty plea. Id. 
At sentencing, the court imposed restitution in the amount of $14,647, the apparent 
difference in cost between the Oxycontin Ms. Martinez received and the cost of the 
Methadone that the State alleged she would have received in the absence of fraud. 
R. 91-93; 61; 77[9].5 However, despite the fact that Ms. Martinez admitted only to 
working under an assumed name and attempted distribution of methamphetamine, both 
the State and the court focused almost exclusively upon unproven allegations regarding 
distribution and receipt of excess Oxycontin. R. 77[10-17]. For example, the following 
colloquy took place between the sentencing court and the State regarding what 
information would have led WCF to refuse to approve the Oxycontin prescription: 
5
 As is discussed in more detail in Section III, the PSR is internally inconsistent as 
to the exact dollar amount of the cost of Oxycontin minus the cost of Methadone. 
Initially, the PSR states that the cost of the Oxycontin alone was $14,647. R. 61[2]. 
Later, the PSR indicates that the cost of Oxycontin minus the Methadone is $14,377.56. 
R.61[7]. 
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The Court: And what is it that they did not know? That she was - -
that the prescription Oxycontin was being distributed to Sundowners? 
Mr. Harms [Prosecutor]: They didn't know that. They didn't 
know - - specifically they didn't know how many pills she was obtaining 
compared to how many she had been prescribed. That amount and that 
specific fact would have caused them to prescribe something else because 
of the very notion of discrepancy . . . . 
R. 77[9]. The State went on to use a chart to attempt to demonstrate that Ms. Martinez 
had received excess Oxycontin, adding that this allegation alone that would have caused 
WCF to prescribe a lesser medication. R. 77[9-10]. The court then repeatedly 
questioned Ms. Martinez and defense counsel regarding these allegations of distributing 
Oxycontin and receiving amounts in excess of her prescription. R. 77[11-13].6 
Ms. Martinez denied these allegations and did not admit to them as part of her 
guilty plea. R. 77[11-13]; R. 39. Furthermore, the charges of obtaining Oxycontin by 
fraud were dismissed and Ms. Martinez was not even charged with attempted distribution 
of Oxycontin. R. 4; R. 39. These alleged crimes are unrelated to working under an 
assumed name and attempting to distribute methamphetamine, which was the only 
conduct Ms. Martinez admitted in her guilty plea. 
As is apparent from the court's questions and discussions with the State, the 
6
 The PSR prepared in this case and relied upon by the court is also erroneous in 
that it is littered with allegations that Ms. Martinez was distributing Oxycontin and that 
she was obtaining amounts of Oxycontin in excess of her prescription by fraud. R. 61 [2-
4]. In fact, only a small portion of the PSR's "Official Version of Offense" deals with 
Ms. Martinez's admitted misconduct in working under a false name and it does not even 
mention attempted distribution of methamphetamine. Id. 
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sentencing court incorrectly imposed restitution based upon the alleged conduct for which 
Ms. Martinez was not charged, was not convicted, did not plead guilty, and did not admit 
responsibility. For example, the court stated that it was imposing restitution based on 
Ms. Martinez's "fraudulent activities." R. 77[16]. While not specifying exactly what 
"fraudulent activities" it was taking into account, it is clear, in light of the previous focus 
of the court's questioning, that the court was imposing restitution based upon the 
allegations that Ms. Martinez was obtaining excess Oxycontin by fraud. 
For example, the court explained its determination by stating: 
The basis, frankly, for the restitution, Mr. Dellapiana [defense 
counsel], is the statement of Dr. Dall who is, after all, the person who writes 
the prescription, that had he known that the defendant was gainfully 
employed under an alias or was receiving an average of 360 Oxycontin pills 
per month he would not have prescribed Oxycontin for the defendant. 
R. 77[15] (emphasis added).7 As stated previously, Ms. Martinez admitted only to 
working under an assumed name. The charges related to the alleged conduct of 
"receiving an average of 360 Oxycontin pills per month" were dismissed and 
Ms. Martinez in no way admitted responsibility for such acts. 
In sum, as part of her plea agreement, Ms. Martinez only admitted to working 
under an assumed name and attempted distribution of methamphetamine. However, the 
7
 As discussed more fully in Section III, the court's basis is clearly contradicted in 
the record. In his own notes, Dr. Dall indicated that he would not have prescribed 
Oxycontin only if Ms. Martinez was "abusing my prescriptions in terms of forging, 
selling, etc.." R. 48. No mention is made of canceling the prescription merely for 
working under an assumed name. 
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sentencing court went outside the confines of these admissions to impose restitution based 
upon alleged misconduct relating to obtaining excess amounts of Oxycontin and 
attempted distribution of Oxycontin—charges that were either amended or dismissed. As 
such, the sentencing court misapplied the restitution statute, Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 
(1999), and the restitution order should be reversed. See State v. Harris, 2001 UT App 
291, *|H[4-5 (reversing order of restitution that violated restitution statute); Watson, 1999 
UT App 273, TJ6 (same); GallL 967 P.2d at 937-38 (same). 
II. THE SENTENCING COURT'S RELIANCE UPON DOUBLE AND 
TRIPLE HEARSAY AS A BASIS FOR IMPOSING RESTITUTION 
VIOLATED DUE PROCESS AND WAS PLAIN ERROR. 
The sentencing court erred and violated Ms. Martinez's due process rights when it 
relied almost exclusively upon double and triple hearsay in determining the amount of 
restitution. Furthermore, as the law at the time of the sentencing hearing was clear, the 
error was plain and requires reversal. 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that, while evidence that would be inadmissible 
at trial may be admissible for sentencing purposes, the "due process clause in both the 
United States and Utah Constitutions 'requires that a sentencing judge act on reasonably 
reliable and relevant information in exercising discretion in fixing a sentence."1 State v. 
Johnson, 856 P.2d 1064, 1071 (Utah 1993) (quoting State v. Howell 707 P.2d 115, 118 
(Utah 1985)); see also State v. Weeks, 2000 UT App 273, ^ |8, 12 P.3d 110 (,f[D]ue 
process requires criminal proceedings including sentencing to be based upon accurate and 
19 
reasonably reliable information."). The defendant in Johnson was sentenced based, in 
large part, upon double and triple hearsay statements included in a report prepared for 
sentencing. Johnson, 856 P.2d at 1071. The Court reversed the defendant's sentence, 
stating that double and triple hearsay is so "inherently unreliable and presents such a high 
probability for inaccuracy that it cannot stand alone as the basis for sentencing." Idj see. 
also InreW.S.. 939 P.2d 196, 201 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (holding that even if double 
hearsay statements are independently admissible under the Utah Rules of Evidence, they 
cannot form the sole basis for sentencing); State v. Brown. 607 P.2d 261, 270 (Utah 
1980) (reversing death sentence because double hearsay admitted during penalty phase); 
United States v. Weston, 448 F.2d 626, 634 (9th Cir. 1971) (reversing sentence when 
presentence report containing hearsay admitted during sentencing). 
In Ms. Martinez's case, the PSR, which is itself hearsay, contains statements made 
by the WCF investigator both those made by himself, which amount to double hearsay, 
and those made by Dr. Dall to the WCF investigator, which are triple hearsay. That the 
sentencing court relied upon these statements is obvious because the portion of the PSR 
which alleges that Ms. Martinez would not have received Oxycontin is comprised 
entirely of double and triple hearsay. The sentencing court itself stated that "[t]he doctor 
tells me through the (inaudible) investigator that he would not have made this 
prescription at all." R. 77[16] (emphasis added). Moreover, as the State presented no 
other evidence that Ms. Martinez would not have received Oxycontin had WCF and 
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Dr. Dall been aware of her part-time employment, these statements provided the sole 
statutory basis for which the court could have determined the amount of restitution. 
Although this issue was not raised at the sentencing hearing, this Court has 
addressed similar plain error claims. See State v. Patience. 944 P.2d 381, 388-89 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1997) (addressing defendant's plain error claim that due process violated when 
sentencing court considered unreliable evidence in determining sentence). To succeed 
on a claim of plain error, the defendant must show: "(i) [a]n error exists; (ii) the error 
should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful." State v. Dunn, 
850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993). 
First, as discussed above, error does exist. Under Johnson, the sentencing court 
should not have used the double and triple hearsay statements as its basis for imposing 
restitution. Second, in order to "show obviousness of the error, [the defendant] must 
show that the law was clear at the time of trial." State v. Garcia. 2001 UT App 19, Tf6, 18 
P.3d 1123; see also State v. Ross, 951 P.2d 236, 239 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) ("[E]rror is 
not plain where there is no settled appellate law to guide the trial court."). The error in 
relying upon double and triple hearsay as the sole basis for the amount of restitution 
should have been obvious to the sentencing court given the clear and unequivocal case 
law to that effect. Finally, prejudice occurs if, "absent the error, there is a reasonable 
likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the appellant, or phrased differently, our 
confidence in the verdict is undermined." Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1208. Here, the obvious 
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error in basing restitution upon double and triple hearsay was prejudicial since no other 
evidence was presented that would support the conclusion that Ms. Martinez owed 
$14,647 in restitution based upon her admitted conduct. 
III. THE RESTITUTION ORDER WAS ERRONEOUS BECAUSE A 
CAUSAL CONNECTION BETWEEN MS. MARTINEZ'S ADMITTED 
ACTS AND PECUNIARY DAMAGES WAS NOT ESTABLISHED AND 
THE ORDER IS CONTRADICTED BY THE CLEAR WEIGHT OF THE 
EVIDENCE. 
The evidence, fully marshaled and regarded in the light most favorable to the 
sentencing court's determination, does not establish either that Ms. Martinez's admitted 
criminal acts were the "but for" cause of pecuniary damages or that Methadone was a 
proper medication in lieu of Oxycontin. 
As stated previously, the restitution statute allows the court to impose restitution 
for admitted criminal conduct that results in pecuniary damages. See Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-3-20 l(4)(a)(i) (1999). The statute defines "pecuniary damages" as 
all special damages, but not general damages, which a person could recover 
against the defendant in a civil action arising out of the facts or events 
constituting the defendant's criminal activities and includes the money 
equivalent of property taken, destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed, and 
losses including earnings and medical expenses. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(l)(c) (1999). This Court has held that a "but for" standard 
must be met to show that a defendant's admitted conduct is causally connected to the 
pecuniary damages. See State v. McBride. 940 P.2d 539, 543-44 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) 
(citing State v. Dotv. 653 P.2d 276, 277-78 (Or. Ct. App. 1982)); see also State v. 
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Robinson. 860 P.2d 979, 983 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) ("Restitution should be ordered only 
in cases where liability is clear as a matter of law and where commission of the crime 
clearly establishes causality of the injury or damages."); State ex rel. Juvenile Dep't v. 
Dickerson. 784 P.2d 1121, 1122 (Or. Ct. App. 1990) (Oregon restitution statute, after 
which Utah's is modeled, requires criminal activity, pecuniary damages, and "a causal 
relationship between the two" in order to impose restitution). In addition, a restitution 
order must be supported by sufficient evidence so that it is not contradicted by the clear 
weight of the evidence. McBride, 940 P.2d at 541-42. 
Here, the sentencing court determined that Ms. Martinez owed restitution for the 
cost of Oxycontin minus the cost of Methadone, the purported alternative medication that 
would have been prescribed absent her alleged misconduct. However, it cannot be said 
that "but for" Ms. Martinez's admitted conduct, WCF suffered $14,647 in pecuniary 
damages. As discussed previously, Ms. Martinez only admitted to working under an 
assumed name and attempting to distribute methamphetamine. Despite this and in 
contravention of the restitution statute, the sentencing court based its restitution order, in 
large part, upon alleged criminal acts for which Ms. Martinez did not plead guilty and did 
not admit responsibility. However, even if the court had limited its consideration to 
Ms. Martinez's admitted conduct, that evidence does not support a determination that her 
conduct caused pecuniary damages of $14,647. 
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The evidence, fully marshaled to support the court's finding that Ms. Martinez's 
admitted conduct8 was the "but for11 cause of $14,647 in pecuniary damages is as follows: 
• Ms. Martinez was prescribed Oxycontin by Dr. Dall, which was 
paid for by WCF as part of her permanent total disability benefits. 
R. 61 [2-3]. 
• On and off, from 1996 to 1998, Ms. Martinez was employed part-
time at Salt Lake Community College under an assumed name. R. 61 [2]. 
• The PSR included statements made by the WCF investigator that, 
had Ms. Martinez5 employment been known, she would not have received 
Oxycontin, but, rather, would have been prescribed Methadone. 
R.61[4,6].9 
• The difference in cost between the Oxycontin Ms. Martinez 
received during the time she was employed and Methadone was 
$14,377.56. R.77[9];61[7]. 
The evidence presented that, had WCF and Dr. Dall known that Ms. Martinez was 
employed part time, she would not have received Oxycontin is directly contradicted by 
reliable evidence. Namely, Ms. Martinez was entitled to receive medical benefits 
regardless of any misconduct. R. 77[8-9]. Pain medication was the only course of 
8
 As the restitution statute and due process require that only admitted conduct be 
considered in determining restitution (see supra Part I), the marshaled evidence only 
includes evidence related to Ms. Martinez's admitted conduct of working under a false 
name and does not include the allegations of fraudulently obtaining amounts of 
Oxycontin in excess of her prescription or attempted distribution of Oxycontin. 
9
 As discussed in the previous section, these statements are double and triple 
hearsay and should not been used as the basis for the award of restitution. Nevertheless, 
even taking these statements into account, the court's restitution order is still contradicted 
by clear weight of the evidence. 
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treatment available for Ms. Martinez's condition and Oxycontin had been determined to 
be the appropriate medication. R. 48-49. Methadone was an inappropriate alternative, 
and Dr. Dall would have continued to prescribe Oxycontin even had he known of 
Ms. Martinez's admitted misconduct of working under an assumed name. Id 
Ms. Martinez's permanent total disability determination was made prior to 1995 
and is, therefore, irrevocable under Utah law.10 As acknowledged by the prosecutor, 
"despite the fact that [Ms. Martinez] was working Workers' Compensation Fund would 
have had to pay for pain medicine." R. 77[8-9]. Having established that Ms. Martinez 
was still entitled to receive pain medication, the only question becomes what medication 
would have been prescribed if her physician had been aware she was working part time. 
Both Dr. Dall and WCF had previously determined that pain medication was the 
only course of treatment open to Ms. Martinez and that Oxycontin was an appropriate 
medication for her condition. R. 48; R. 61 [3]. Dr. Dall indicated that he would not 
provide further Oxycontin only if Ms. Martinez "has been abusing my prescriptions in 
10
 In 1995, the legislature amended the Workers' Compensation Act to allow for 
modification or termination of permanent total disability determinations. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 34A-2-413 (1998). Despite this change, rights under the Workers' Compensation 
Act are "determined on the basis of the law as it existed at the time of the occurrence . . . 
a later statute or amendment should not be applied in a retroactive manner to deprive a 
party of his rights or impose greater liability." Okland Constr. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 
520 P.2d 208, 210 (Utah 1974); accord Mesa Dev. Co. v. Sandv City Corp., 948 P.2d 
366, 367 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). Thus, as admitted by the State, Ms. Martinez's benefits 
are not subject to termination or modification because her determination of permanent 
total disability was made in 1994, prior to amendment of the statute. R. 77[8-9]. 
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terms of forging, selling, etc.." R. 49. Dr. Dall did not suggest that he would have 
canceled the Oxycontin prescription merely because Ms. Martinez was working under an 
assumed name. Even in the face of the original charges against Ms. Martinez related to 
fraudulently obtaining amounts of Oxycontin in excess of her prescription and attempting 
to distribute Oxycontin, Dr. Dall continued to prescribe Oxycontin because he felt that it 
was his "medical responsibility to provide appropriate treatment regardless of allegations 
until those allegations are proven." Id. Obviously, those allegations were not proven and 
Ms. Martinez did not admit responsibility for them.11 Thus, the clear weight of the 
evidence shows that Ms. Martinez would have received Oxycontin even if Dr. Dall had 
known that she was working part time. The State presented no reliable evidence to 
suggest that WCF could have overridden Dr. Dall's medical decision to continue 
prescribing Oxycontin, even had they known of her employment. 
In addition, the State asserted, and the sentencing court assumed, that Methadone 
would have been prescribed instead of Oxycontin in the absence of Ms. Martinez's 
misconduct. However, this assertion is directly contradicted in the record and there is no 
evidence to suggest that Methadone was an appropriate medication that would have been 
prescribed to Ms. Martinez. Quite the opposite, the only evidence in the record indicates 
11
 The PSR and the State alleged that WCF would not have paid for Oxycontin 
and Dr. Dall would not have approved Oxycontin based solely upon Ms. Martinez's 
admitted conduct of working under an assumed name. R. 61 [3-4]. However, the State 
made no showing that Ms. Martinez was not entitled to receive Oxycontin regardless of 
her admitted misconduct. 
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that Methadone was an entirely inappropriate course of treatment for Ms. Martinez's 
condition. At WCF's behest, Dr. Dall did attempt to prescribe Methadone. R. 48. 
However, Ms. Martinez suffered a severe skin rash which did not clear up even when 
steroids were administered. Id. The Methadone prescription was immediately 
discontinued and Ms. Martinez was prescribed MS Contin. Id. Therefore, even if the 
sentencing court had properly determined that Ms. Martinez was not entitled to receive 
Oxycontin, there is no basis for the court to have concluded that she would have been 
prescribed Methadone, a cheap alternative, and offset that amount in determining 
restitution. 
Finally, the sentencing court imposed restitution of $14,647 based upon the cost of 
Oxycontin minus the cost of Methadone. However, as argued by the prosecutor, the 
difference in cost between Oxycontin and Methadone was $14,377.56. R. 61 [7]; 77[9]. 
Not only is this discrepancy of $269.44 unexplained and unaccounted for, but the State 
presented no evidence of the actual cost of the Methadone.12 
Therefore, it is undisputed that Ms. Martinez was entitled to receive some form of 
medication, that Oxycontin was appropriate and would have been prescribed by Dr. Dall 
unless Ms. Martinez was proven to have forged prescriptions or distributed Oxycontin. In 
12
 Presumably, the $269.44 figure could be accounted for as the cost of the 
Methadone. However, no evidence was presented and this would mean that the cost of 
the Oxycontin prescribed by Dr. Dall was some fifty-four times the cost of the 
Methadone. 
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contrast, there is no evidence to support the conclusion that Methadone would have been 
prescribed in the absence of Oxycontin and, thus, no evidence to support the court's 
determination that the amount of restitution should be the difference in cost between 
Oxycontin and Methadone. Finally, the State presented no evidence as to the cost of 
Methadone. As such, the sentencing court's order is clearly erroneous and should be 
reversed. 
IV. THE SENTENCING COURT ERRED IN NOT RESOLVING 
MS. MARTINEZ'S OBJECTIONS TO THE CONTENTS OF THE 
PRESENTENCE REPORT. 
The restitution order requires vacation regardless of whether the objections are 
resolved since the trial court imposed restitution in violation of due process for conduct 
for which Ms. Martinez was not convicted, did not admit and did not plead guilty. On 
remand, however, controlling case law requires that the trial court resolve the 
inaccuracies in the presentence report. 
The sentencing court erred because it did not make specific findings on the record 
after Ms. Martinez repeatedly objected to the contents of the PSR and asked the court to 
correct mistakes in the report. R. 77[7, 11-13, 17, 19-20]. Under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-18-l(6)(a) (1999), when a defendant objects to the contents of a presentence 
investigation report, the sentencing court is required to "resolve on the record any claimed 
inaccuracies in the report." State v. Veteto, 2000 UT 62, f 13, 6 P.3d 1133 (citing State v. 
Jaeger, 1999 UT 1, ffl|44-45, 973 P.2d 404). 
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Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(6)(a) (1999) provides: 
Any alleged inaccuracies in the presentence investigation report, which 
have not been resolved by the parties and the department [of Corrections] 
prior to sentencing, shall be brought to the attention of the sentencing judge, 
and the judge may grant an additional ten working days to resolve the 
alleged inaccuracies of the report with the department [of Corrections]. If 
after ten working days the inaccuracies cannot be resolved, the court shall 
make a determination of relevance and accuracy on the record. 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that, this section "requires the sentencing judge to 
consider the party's objections to the report, make findings on the record as to whether 
the information objected to is accurate, and determine on the record whether that 
information is relevant to the issue of sentencing." Jaeger, 1999 UT 1, f44. Moreover, 
the sentencing court is required to make specific findings, "[i]t is insufficient to make 
general statements 'concerning the court's view of the defendant and the case.'" Veteto, 
2000 UT 62, U14 (quoting Jaeger. 1999 UT 1,1J44). 
In Veteto, the defendant objected to the presentence report's inclusion of a prior 
out-of-state felony conviction, inaccuracies in the aggravating circumstances that were 
listed, and the failure to include the defendant's youth as a mitigating factor. Id at ^ [15. 
The sentencing court properly corrected the error as to the previous conviction, but failed 
to make any specific findings on the record as to the other alleged inaccuracies. Id Even 
though the sentencing court was aware of these issues and heard arguments, the Utah 
Supreme Court found that the statute had not been complied with and remanded for 
resolution of the defendant's objections and entry of specific findings on the record. Id; 
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see also State v. Kohl. 2000 UT 35,1HJ33-35, 999 P.2d 7 (remanding where sentencing 
court did not make specific findings regarding objections to presentence report); Jaeger, 
1999 UT 1, ffl[41-45 (same). On remand, the sentencing court "may hold an additional 
hearing if required by the circumstances, or simply enter the necessary findings upon the 
record where the contested issues were presented to the court and considered at the 
sentencing hearing." Veteto. 2000 UT 62, [^15. 
Here, Ms. Martinez objected to many of the contents of the PSR. For instance, 
defense counsel stated to the court: 
There's one major correction or clarification and these the court 
needs to take notice of, and that's that - - we raised the last time we were 
here for sentencing. That has to do with the allegation that Ms. Martinez 
and I as her attorney have in some way recently been trying to commit fraud 
upon the Workers' Compensation Fund. 
R. 77[7]. Not only were no specific findings made regarding this inaccuracy in the PSR, 
the sentencing court did not even address the issue. Id. Ms. Martinez also objected 
repeatedly to the PSR's inclusion of conduct for which she was not convicted, did not 
plead guilty, and did not admit responsibility. R. 77[11-13]. Objections were raised 
concerning the PSR's assumptions that Ms. Martinez was not entitled to receive medical 
benefits, that Oxycontin would not have been prescribed based on her admitted conduct, 
and that Methadone would have been prescribed in the absence of fraud. R. 77[17, 
19-20]. Finally, Ms. Martinez objected to the PSR's inclusion of allegations that 
Ms. Martinez was lying when she said that she was allergic to Methadone. R. 77[17]. 
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Although the sentencing court was aware of these objections and heard arguments 
concerning some of them, it made no specific findings regarding them. As such, the 
sentencing court failed to comply with the requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-
l(6)(a) (1999). For the reasons outlined in Points I, II and III, the restitution order must 
be vacated regardless of whether Ms. Martinez's objections are resolved. On remand, 
however, the trial court should be required to enter specific findings resolving 
Ms. Martinez's objections. See Veteto, 2000 UT 62, ^ [15. Also, additional hearings are 
required on remand because the sentencing court did not allow many of Ms. Martinez's 
objections to be fully presented and considered. Id. 
CONCLUSION 
Ms. Martinez respectfully requests that this Court reverse the order imposing 
restitution and remand for an additional hearing and entry of specific findings regarding 
objections to the PSR. The sentencing court's order constitutes a misinterpretation of the 
restitution statute, Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-20l(4)(a)(i) (1999) and violates procedural due 
process because the court based its determination upon conduct for which Ms. Martinez 
did not admit responsibility. In addition, the court improperly relied upon unreliable 
evidence in determining the amount of restitution. Furthermore, the amount of restitution 
imposed by the court is not supported by the evidence and is contradicted by the clear 
weight of the evidence. Finally, the sentencing court failed to comply with the 
requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(6)(a) (1999) by not making specific findings 
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regarding Ms. Martinez's objections to the accuracy of the PSR. 
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2. ATTEMPTED POSS W/INTENT TO DIST CONTR/CNTRFT SUBST - 3rd Degree 
Felony 
- Disposition: 09/05/2000 {Guilty Plea} 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of WORKERS COMPENSATION 
INSURANCE FRAUD a 2nd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to 
an indeterminate term of not less than one year nor more than 
fifteen years in the Utah State Prison. 
The prison term is suspended. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of ATTEMPTED POSS W/INTENT TO 
DIST CONTR/CNTRFT SUBST a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is 
sentenced to an indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in 
the Utah State Prison. 
The prison term is suspended. 
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SENTENCE JAIL 
Based on the defendant's conviction of WORKERS COMPENSATION 
INSURANCE FRAUD a 2nd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to 
a term of 60 
Commitment is to begin immediately. 
SENTENCE FINE 
Charge # 1 Fine: $400.00 
Suspended: $0.00 
Surcharge: $183.78 
Due: $400.00 
Total Fine: 
Total Suspended: 
Total Surcharge: 
Total Principal Due: 
$400.00 
$0 
$183.78 
$400.00 
Plus Interest 
SENTENCE FINE PAYMENT NOTE 
C/o deft to pay restitution of $14,647 at the rate $100 a month 
beginning 4/1/2001 towards restitution. All fine and restitution 
to be paid through AP&P. 
ORDER OF PROBATION 
The defendant is placed on probation for 2 year(s). 
Probation is to be supervised by Adult Probation & Parole. 
Defendant to serve 60 day(s) jail. 
Defendant is to pay a fine of 400.00 which includes the surcharge, 
Interest may increase the final amount due. 
Pay fine to The Court. 
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PROBATION CONDITIONS 
Usual and ordinary conditions required by the Department of Adult 
Probation & Parole. 
Submit to searches of person and property upon the request of any 
Law Enforcement Officer. 
Do not use, consume or possess alcohol or illegal drugs, nor 
associate with any people using, possessing or consuming alcohol or 
illegal drugs. 
Submit to tests of breath and urine upon the request of any Law 
Enforcement Officer. 
Participate in and complete any educational; and/or vocational 
training as directed by the Department of Adult Probation and 
Parole. 
Violate no laws. 
Enter, participate in, and complete any program, counseling, or 
treatment as directed by the Department of Adult Probation and 
Parole. 
Pay restitution as determined by Probation Officer. 
Submit to drug testing. 
Not frequent any place where drugs are used, sold, or otherwise 
distributed illegally. 
Refrain from the use of alcoholic beverages. 
Report regularly 
No contact with Sundowners except for immediate family members 
State to provide AP&P with list of persons deft to have no conact 
with 
SENTENCE PROBATION SERVICE NOTE 
C/o probation to run consecutive on each count 
Dated this jp ~-^ day of 
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ADDENDUM B 
76-3-201. Definitions — Sentences or combination of sen-
tences allowed — Civil penalties — Restitution 
— Hearing. 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "Conviction" includes a: 
(i) judgment of guilt; and 
(ii) plea of guilty. 
(b) "Criminal activities" means any offense of which the defendant is 
convicted or any other criminal conduct for which the defendant admits 
responsibility to the sentencing court with or without an admission of 
committing the criminal conduct. 
(c) "Pecuniary damages" means all special damages, but not general 
damages, which a person could recover against the defendant in a civil 
action arising out of the facts or events constituting the defendant's 
criminal activities and includes the money equivalent of property taken, 
destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed, and losses including earnings 
and medical expenses. 
(d) "Restitution" means full, partial, or nominal payment for pecuniary 
damages to a victim, including the accrual of interest from the time of 
sentencing, insured damages, and payment for expenses to a governmen-
tal entity for extradition or transportation and as further defined in 
Subsection (4)(c). 
(e) (i) "Victim" means any person whom the court determines has 
suffered pecuniary damages as a result of the defendant's criminal 
activities. 
(ii) "Victim" does not include any coparticipant in the defendant's 
criminal activities. 
(2) Within the limits prescribed by this chapter, a court may sentence a 
person convicted of an offense to any one of the following sentences or 
combination of them: 
(a) to pay a fine; 
(b) to removal or disqualification from public or private office; 
(c) to probation unless otherwise specifically provided by law; 
(d) to imprisonment; 
(e) to life imprisonment; 
(f) on or after April 27, 1992, to life in prison without parole; or 
(g) to death. 
(3) (a) This chapter does not deprive a court of authority conferred by law 
to: 
(i) forfeit property; 
(ii) dissolve a corporation; 
(hi) suspend or cancel a license; 
(iv) permit removal of a person from office; 
(v) cite for contempt; or 
(vi) impose any other civil penalty. 
(b) A civil penalty may be included in a sentence. 
(4) (a) (i) When a person is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted 
in pecuniary damages, in addition to any other sentence it may 
impose, the court shall order that the defendant make restitution to 
victims of crime as provided in this subsection, or for conduct for 
which the defendant has agreed to make restitution as part of a plea 
agreement. For purposes of restitution, a victim has the meaning as 
defined in Subsection (l)(e). 
(ii) In determining whether restitution is appropriate, the court 
shall follow the criteria and procedures as provided in Subsections 
(4X0 and (4)(d). 
(iii) If the court finds the defendant owes restitution, the clerk of 
the court shall enter an order of complete restitution as defined in 
Subsection (8)(b) on the civil judgment docket and provide notice of 
the order to the parties. 
(iv) The order is considered a legal judgment enforceable under the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and the person in whose favor the 
restitution order is entered may seek enforcement of the restitution 
order in accordance with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. In 
addition, the Department of Corrections may, on behalf of the person 
in whose favor the restitution order is entered, enforce the restitution 
order as judgment creditor under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
(v) If the defendant fails to obey a court order for payment of 
restitution and the victim or department elects to pursue collection of 
the order by civil process, the victim shall be entitled to recover 
reasonable attorneys fees. 
(vi) A judgment ordering restitution constitutes a hen when re-
corded in a judgment docket and shall have the same effect and is 
subject to the same rules as a judgment for money in a civil action. 
Interest shall accrue on the amount ordered from the time of sentenc-
ing. 
(vii) The Department of Corrections shall make rules permitting 
the restitution payments to be credited to principal first and the 
remainder of payments credited to interest in accordance with Title 
63, Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act. 
(b) (i) If a defendant has been extradited to this state under Title 77, 
Chapter 30, Extradition, to resolve pending criminal charges and is 
convicted of criminal activity in the county to which he has been 
returned, the court may, in addition to any other sentence it may 
impose, order that the defendant make restitution for costs expended 
by any governmental entity for the extradition. 
(ii) In determining whether restitution is appropriate, the court 
shall consider the criteria in Subsection (4)(c). 
(c) In determining restitution, the court shall determine complete 
restitution and court-ordered restitution. 
(i) Complete restitution means the restitution necessary to com-
pensate a victim for all losses caused by the defendant. 
(ii) Court-ordered restitution means the restitution the court hav-
ing criminal jurisdiction orders the defendant to pay as a part of the 
criminal sentence at the time of sentencing. 
(iii) Complete restitution and court-ordered restitution shall be 
determined as provided in Subsection (8). 
(d) (i) If the court determines that restitution is appropriate or inap-
propriate under this subsection, the court shall make the reasons for 
the decision a part of the court record. 
(ii) In any civil action brought by a victim to enforce the judgment, 
the defendant shall be entitled to offset any amounts that have been 
paid as part of court-ordered restitution to the victim. 
(iii) A judgment ordering restitution constitutes a hen when re-
corded in a judgment docket and shall have the same effect and is 
subject to the same rules as a judgment for money in a civil action. 
Interest shall accrue on the amount ordered from the time of sentenc-
ing. 
(iv) The Department of Corrections shall make rules permitting the 
restitution payments to be credited to principal first and the remain-
der of payments credited to interest in accordance with Title 63, 
Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act. 
(e) If the defendant objects to the imposition, amount, or distribution of 
the restitution, the court shall at the time of sentencing allow the 
defendant a full hearing on the issue. 
(5) (a) In addition to any other sentence the court may impose, the court 
shall order the defendant to pay restitution of governmental transporta-
tion expenses if the defendant was: 
(i) transported pursuant to court order from one county to another 
within the state at governmental expense to resolve pending criminal 
charges; 
(ii) charged with a felony or a class A, B, or C misdemeanor; and 
(iii) convicted of a crime. 
(b) The court may not order the defendant to pay restitution of 
governmental transportation expenses if any of the following apply: 
(i) the defendant is charged with an infraction or on a subsequent 
failure to appear a warrant is issued for an infraction; or 
(ii) the defendant was not transported pursuant to a court order. 
(c) (i) Restitution of governmental transportation expenses under Sub-
section (5)(a)(i) shall be calculated according to the following schedule: 
(A) $75 for up to 100 miles a defendant is transported; 
(B) $125 for 100 up to 200 miles a defendant is transported; 
and 
(C) $250 for 200 miles or more a defendant is transported. 
(ii) The schedule of restitution under Subsection (5)(c)(i) applies to 
each defendant transported regardless of the number of defendants 
actually transported in a single trip. 
(6) (a) If a statute under which the defendant was convicted mandates that 
one of three stated minimum terms shall be imposed, the court shall order 
imposition of the term of middle severity unless there are circumstances in 
aggravation or mitigation of the crime. 
(b) Prior to or at the time of sentencing, either party may submit a 
statement identifying circumstances in aggravation or mitigation or 
presenting additional facts. If the statement is in writing, it shall be filed 
with the court and served on the opposing party at least four days prior to 
the time set for sentencing. 
(c) In determining whether there are circumstances that justify impo-
sition of the highest or lowest term, the court may consider the record in 
the case, the probation officer's report, other reports, including reports 
received under Section 76-3-404, statements in aggravation or mitigation 
submitted by the prosecution or the defendant, and any further evidence 
introduced at the sentencing hearing. 
(d) The court shall set forth on the record the facts supporting and 
reasons for imposing the upper or lower term. 
(e) In determining a just sentence, the court shall consider sentencing 
guidelines regarding aggravating and mitigating circumstances promul-
gated by the Sentencing Commission. 
(7) If during the commission of a crime described as child kidnaping, rape of 
a child, object rape of a child, sodomy upon a child, or sexual abuse of a child, 
the defendant causes substantial bodily injury to the child, and if the charge is 
set forth in the information or indictment and admitted by the defendant, or 
found true by a judge or jury at trial, the defendant shall be sentenced to the 
highest minimum term in state prison. This subsection takes precedence over 
any conflicting provision of law. 
(8) (a) For the purpose of determining restitution for an offense, the offense 
shall include any criminal conduct admitted by the defendant to the 
sentencing court or to which the defendant agrees to pay restitution. A 
victim of an offense, that involves as an element a scheme, a conspiracy, or 
a pattern of criminal activity, includes any person directly harmed by the 
defendant's criminal conduct in the course of the scheme, conspiracy, or 
pattern. 
(b) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for complete 
restitution, the court shall consider all relevant facts, including: 
(i) the cost of the damage or loss if the offense resulted in damage 
to or loss or destruction of property of a victim of the offense; 
(ii) the cost of necessary medical and related professional services 
and devices relating to physical, psychiatric, and psychological care, 
including nonmedical care and treatment rendered in accordance with 
a method of healing recognized by the law of the place of treatment; 
the cost of necessary physical and occupational therapy and rehabili-
tation; and the income lost by the victim as a result of the offense if the 
offense resulted in bodily injury to a victim; and 
(iii) the cost of necessary funeral and related services if the offense 
resulted in the death of a victim. 
(c) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for court-
ordered restitution, the court shall consider the factors listed in Subsec-
tion (8Kb) and: 
(i) the financial resources of the defendant and the burden that 
payment of restitution will impose, with regard to the other obliga-
tions of the defendant; 
(ii) the ability of the defendant to pay restitution on an installment 
basis or on other conditions to be fixed by the court; 
(iii) the rehabilitative effect on the defendant of the payment of 
restitution and the method of payment; and 
(iv) other circumstances which the court determines make restitu-
tion inappropriate. 
(d) The court may decline to make an order or may defer entering an 
order of restitution if the court determines that the complication and 
prolongation of the sentencing process, as a result of considering an order 
of restitution under this subsection, substantially outweighs the need to 
provide restitution to the victim. 
77-18-1. Suspension of sentence — Pleas held in abeyance 
— Probation — Supervision — Presentence in-
vestigation — Standards — Confidentiality — 
Terms and conditions — Restitution — Termina-
tion, revocation, modification, or extension — 
Hearings — Electronic monitoring. 
(1) On a plea of guilty or no contest entered by a defendant in conjunction 
with a plea in abeyance agreement, the court may hold the plea in abeyance as 
provided in Title 77, Chapter 2a, Pleas in Abeyance, and under the terms of the 
plea in abeyance agreement. 
(2) (a) On a plea of guilty, guilty and mentally ill, no contest, or conviction 
of any crime or offense, the court may suspend the imposition or execution 
of sentence and place the defendant on probation. The court may place the 
defendant: 
(i) on probation under the supervision of the Department of Cor-
rections except in cases of class C misdemeanors or infractions; 
(ii) on probation with an agency of local government or with a 
private organization; or 
(iii) on bench probation under the jurisdiction of the sentencing 
court. 
(b) (i) The legal custody of all probationers under the supervision of the 
department is with the department. 
(ii) The legal custody of all probationers under the jurisdiction of 
the sentencing court is vested as ordered by the court. 
(iii) The court has continuing jurisdiction over all probationers. 
(3) (a) The department shall establish supervision and presentence inves-
tigation standards for all individuals referred to the department. These 
standards shall be based on: 
(i) the type of offense; 
(ii) the demand for services; 
(iii) the availability of agency resources; 
(iv) the public safety; and 
(v) other criteria established by the department to determine what 
level of services shall be provided. 
(b) Proposed supervision and investigation standards shall be submit-
ted to the Judicial Council and the Board of Pardons and Parole on an 
annual basis for review and comment prior to adoption by the department. 
(c) The Judicial Council and the department shall establish procedures 
to implement the supervision and investigation standards. 
(d) The Judicial Council and the department shall annually consider 
modifications to the standards based upon criteria in Subsection (3)(a) and 
other criteria as they consider appropriate. 
(e) The Judicial Council and the department shall annually prepare an 
impact report and submit it to the appropriate legislative appropriations 
subcommittee. 
(4) Notwithstanding other provisions of law, the department is not required 
to supervise the probation of persons convicted of class B or C misdemeanors 
or infractions or to conduct presentence investigation reports on class C 
misdemeanors or infractions. However, the department may supervise the 
probation of class B misdemeanants in accordance with department standards. 
(5) (a) Prior to the imposition of any sentence, the court may, with the 
concurrence of the defendant, continue the date for the imposition of 
sentence for a reasonable period of time for the purpose of obtaining a 
presentence investigation report from the department or information from 
other sources about the defendant. 
(b) The presentence investigation report shall include a victim impact 
statement describing the effect of the crime on the victim and the victim's 
family. The victim impact statement shall: 
(i) identify the victim of the offense; 
(ii) include a specific statement of the recommended amount of 
complete restitution as defined in Subsection 76-3-201(4), accompa-
nied by a recommendation from the department regarding the pay-
ment of court-ordered restitution as defined in Subsection 76-3-201(4) 
by the defendant; 
(iii) identify any physical injury suffered by the victim as a result of 
the offense along with its seriousness and permanence; 
(iv) describe any change in the victim's personal welfare or familial 
relationships as a result of the offense; 
(v) identify any request for psychological services initiated by the 
victim or the victim's family as a result of the offense; and 
(vi) contain any other information related to the impact of the 
offense upon the victim or the victim's family that is relevant to the 
trial court's sentencing determination. 
(c) The presentence investigation report shall include a specific state-
ment of pecuniary damages, accompanied by a recommendation from the 
department regarding the payment of restitution with interest by the 
defendant in accordance with Subsection 76-3-201(4). 
(d) The contents of the presentence investigation report, including any 
diagnostic evaluation report ordered by the court under Section 76-3-404, 
are protected and are not available except by court order for purposes of 
sentencing as provided by rule of the Judicial Council or for use by the 
department. 
(6) (a) The department shall provide the presentence investigation report 
to the defendant's attorney, or the defendant if not represented by counsel, 
the prosecutor, and the court for review, three working days prior to 
sentencing. Any alleged inaccuracies in the presentence investigation 
report, which have not been resolved by the parties and the department 
prior to sentencing, shall be brought to the attention of the sentencing 
judge, and the judge may grant an additional ten working days to resolve 
the alleged inaccuracies of the report with the department. If after ten 
working days the inaccuracies cannot be resolved, the court shall make a 
determination of relevance and accuracy on the record. 
(b) If a party fails to challenge the accuracy of the presentence inves-
tigation report at the time of sentencing, that matter shall be considered 
to be waived. 
(7) At the time of sentence, the court shall receive any testimony, evidence, 
or information the defendant or the prosecuting attorney desires to present 
concerning the appropriate sentence. This testimony, evidence, or information 
shall be presented in open court on record and in the presence of the defendant. 
(8) While on probation, and as a condition of probation, the court may 
require that the defendant: 
(a) perform any or all of the following: 
(i) pay, in one or several sums, any fine imposed at the time of being 
placed on probation; 
(ii) pay amounts required under Title 77, Chapter 32a, Defense 
Costs; 
(iii) provide for the support of others for whose support he is legally 
liable; 
(iv) participate in available treatment programs; 
(v) serve a period of time, not to exceed one year, in a county jail 
designated by the department, after considering any recommendation 
by the court as to which jail the court finds most appropriate; 
(vi) serve a term of home confinement, which may include the use 
of electronic monitoring; 
(vii) participate in compensatory service restitution programs, in-
cluding the compensatory service program provided in Section 78-11-
20.7; 
(viii) pay for the costs of investigation, probation, and treatment 
services; 
(ix) make restitution or reparation to the victim or victims with 
interest in accordance with Subsection 76-3-201(4); and 
(x) comply with other terms and conditions the court considers 
appropriate; and 
(b) if convicted on or after May 5, 1997: 
(i) complete high school classwork and obtain a high school gradu-
ation diploma, a GED certificate, or a vocational certificate at the 
defendant's own expense if the defendant has not received the 
diploma, GED certificate, or vocational certificate prior to being 
placed on probation; or 
(ii) provide documentation of the inability to obtain one of the items 
listed in Subsection (8)(b)(i) because of: 
(A) a diagnosed learning disability; or 
(B) other justified cause. 
(9) The department shall collect and disburse the account receivable as 
defined by Section 76-3-201.1, with interest and any other costs assessed under 
Section 64-13-21 during: 
(a) the parole period and any extension of that period in accordance 
with Subsection 77-27-6(4); and 
(b) the probation period in cases for which the court orders supervised 
probation and any extension of that period by the department in accor-
dance with Subsection 77-18-1(10). 
(10) (a) (i) Probation may be terminated at any time at the discretion of the 
court or upon completion without violation of 36 months probation in 
felony or class A misdemeanor cases, or 12 months in cases of class B 
or C misdemeanors or infractions, 
(ii) (A) If, upon expiration or termination of the probation period 
under Subsection (10)(a)(i), there remains an unpaid balance 
upon the account receivable as defined in Section 76-3-201.1, the 
court may retain jurisdiction of the case and continue the defen-
dant on bench probation for the limited purpose of enforcing the 
payment of the account receivable. 
(B) In accordance with Section 77-18-6, the court shall record 
in the registry of civil judgments any unpaid balance not already 
recorded and immediately transfer responsibility to collect the 
account to the Office of State Debt Collection, 
(iii) Upon motion of the Office of State Debt Collection, prosecutor, 
victim, or upon its own motion, the court may require the defendant to 
show cause why his failure to pay should not be treated as contempt 
of court, 
(b) (i) The department shall notify the sentencing court, the Office of 
State Debt Collection, and the prosecuting attorney in writing in 
advance in all cases when termination of supervised probation will 
occur by law. 
(ii) The notification shall include a probation progress report and 
complete report of details on outstanding accounts receivable. 
(11) (a) (i) Any time served by a probationer outside of confinement after 
having been charged with a probation violation and prior to a hearing 
to revoke probation does not constitute service of time toward the total 
probation term unless the probationer is exonerated at a hearing to 
revoke the probation. 
(ii) Any time served in confinement awaiting a hearing or decision 
concerning revocation of probation does not constitute service of time 
toward the total probation term unless the probationer is exonerated 
at the hearing. 
(b) The running of the probation period is tolled upon the filing of a 
violation report with the court alleging a violation of the terms and 
conditions of probation or upon the issuance of an order to show cause or 
warrant by the court. 
(12) (a) (i) Probation may not be modified or extended except upon waiver 
of a hearing by the probationer or upon a hearing and a finding in 
court that the probationer has violated the conditions of probation. 
(ii) Probation may not be revoked except upon a hearing in court 
and a finding that the conditions of probation have been violated. 
(b) (i) Upon the filing of an affidavit alleging with particularity facts 
asserted to constitute violation of the conditions of probation, the 
court that authorized probation shall determine if the affidavit 
establishes probable cause to believe that revocation, modification, or 
extension of probation is justified. 
(ii) If the court determines there is probable cause, it shall cause to 
be served on the defendant a warrant for his arrest or a copy of the 
affidavit and an order to show cause why his probation should not be 
revoked, modified, or extended. 
(c) (i) The order to show cause shall specify a time and place for the 
hearing and shall be served upon the defendant at least five days prior 
to the hearing. 
(ii) The defendant shall show good cause for a continuance. 
(iii) The order to show cause shall inform the defendant of a right 
to be represented by counsel at the hearing and to have counsel 
appointed for him if he is indigent. 
(iv) The order shall also inform the defendant of a right to present 
evidence. 
(d) (i) At the hearing, the defendant shall admit or deny the allegations 
of the affidavit. 
(ii) If the defendant denies the allegations of the affidavit, the 
prosecuting attorney shall present evidence on the allegations. 
(iii) The persons who have given adverse information on which the 
allegations are based shall be presented as witnesses subject to 
questioning by the defendant unless the court for good cause other-
wise orders. 
(iv) The defendant may cadi witnesses, appear and speak in his own 
behalf, and present evidence. 
(e) (i) After the hearing the court shall make findings of fact. 
(ii) Upon a finding that the defendant violated the conditions of 
probation, the court may order the probation revoked, modified, 
continued, or that the entire probation term commence anew. 
(iii) If probation is revoked, the defendant shall be sentenced or the 
sentence previously imposed shall be executed. 
(13) Restitution imposed under this chapter and interest accruing in accor-
dance with Subsection 76-3-201(4) is considered a debt for willful and mali-
cious injury for purposes of exceptions listed to discharge in bankruptcy as 
provided in Title 11 U.S.C.A. Sec. 523, 1985. 
(14) The court may order the defendant to commit himself to the custody of 
the Division of Mental Health for treatment at the Utah State Hospital as a 
condition of probation or stay of sentence, only after the superintendent of the 
Utah State Hospital or his designee has certified to the court that: 
(a) the defendant is appropriate for and can benefit from treatment at 
the state hospital; 
(b) treatment space at the hospital is available for the defendant; and 
(c) persons described in Subsection 62A-12-209(2)(g) are receiving pri-
ority for treatment over the defendants described in this Subsection (14). 
(15) Presentence investigation reports, including presentence diagnostic 
evaluations, are classified protected in accordance with Title 63, Chapter 2, 
Government Records Access and Management Act. Notwithstanding Sections 
63-2-403 and 63-2-404, the State Records Committee may not order the 
disclosure of a presentence investigation report. Except for disclosure at the 
time of sentencing pursuant to this section, the department may disclose the 
presentence investigation only when: 
(a) ordered by the court pursuant to Subsection 63-2-202(7); 
(b) requested by a law enforcement agency or other agency approved by 
the department for purposes of supervision, confinement, and treatment of 
the offender; 
(c) requested by the Board of Pardons and Parole; 
(d) requested by the subject of the presentence investigation report or 
the subject's authorized representative; or 
(e) requested by the victim of the crime discussed in the presentence 
investigation report or the victim's authorized representative, provided 
that the disclosure to the victim shall include only information relating to 
statements or materials provided by the victim, to the circumstances of the 
crime including statements by the defendant, or to the impact of the crime 
on the victim or the victim's household. 
(16) (a) The court shall consider home confinement as a condition of 
probation under the supervision of the department, except as provided in 
Sections 76-3-406 and 76-5-406.5. 
(b) The department shall establish procedures and standards for home 
confinement, including electronic monitoring, for all individuals referred 
to the department in accordance with Subsection (17). 
(17) (a) If the court places the defendant on probation under this section, it 
may order the defendant to participate in home confinement through the 
use of electronic monitoring as described in this section until further order 
of the court. 
(b) The electronic monitoring shall alert the department and the 
appropriate law enforcement unit of the defendant's whereabouts. 
(c) The electronic monitoring device shall be used under conditions 
which require: 
(i) the defendant to wear an electronic monitoring device at all 
times; and 
(ii) that a device be placed in the home of the defendant, so that the 
defendant's compliance with the court's order may be monitored. 
(d) If a court orders a defendant to participate in home confinement 
through electronic monitoring as a condition of probation under this 
section, it shall: 
(i) place the defendant on probation under the supervision of the 
Department of Corrections; 
(ii) order the department to place an electronic monitoring device 
on the defendant and install electronic monitoring equipment in the 
residence of the defendant; and 
(iii) order the defendant to pay the costs associated with home 
confinement to the department or the program provider. 
(e) The department shall pay the costs of home confinement through 
electronic monitoring only for those persons who have been determined to 
be indigent by the court. 
(f) The department may provide the electronic monitoring described in 
this section either directly or by contract with a private provider. 
